Assignment of Employee Noncompetes in the Acquisition Context

The recent decision of the Nevada Supreme Court in HD Supply Facilities Maintenance, Ltd. v. Bymoen, No. 50989, 2009 BL 127544 (Nev. June 11, 2009), in which the Court held that a survivor of a statutory merger can enforce a noncompete between the non-survivor of that merger and an employee of the non-survivor, reminded us of the various positions courts have taken with respect to the assignment of noncompetes in various acquisition contexts: 

California: John Douglas of our San Francisco office writes:

In many states today, covenants not to compete are considered valid so long as they are reasonably imposed.  In California, covenants not to compete are void unless one of three statutory exceptions apply.  Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 16600.  One such exception applies in the context of the sale of a business.  Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 16601.  Section 16601 provides that any person who sells the goodwill of a business may agree with the buyer to refrain from carrying on a similar business within a specified geographic area so long as the buyer carries on a like business in that area.  Id.; see also Hill Medical Corp. v. Wycoff, 86 Cal. App. 4th 895, 903 (2001).  This provision encompasses statutory mergers as well.  Hilb, Rogal and Hamilton Insurance Services, Inc. v. Robb, 33 Cal. App. 4th 1812, 1824-25 (1995).  Under California law, a covenant not to compete that arises in the context of the sale of a business may be assigned to subsequent purchasers.  See Consolidated Photographic Industries v. Marks, 109 Cal. App. 2d 310, 312-13 (1952) (holding that a noncompetition agreement is enforceable against the former owner of a company when the buyer of the company discontinued its operations under its own name and sold all its assets to another company). 

Florida: Christi Adams of our Orlando office writes:

Under Florida law, if the parties have agreed to and contracted to allow enforcement of the contract by a successor party, the court lacks the discretion to deny enforcement of the contract because the successor was not an original signatory. § 542.335, Fla. Stat.  In contrast, in a sale or purchase of corporate assets alone, the acquiring business does not as a matter of law assume the liabilities of the predecessor business, since the selling corporation may continue in existence, dissolve, or merge with the purchasing entity.   Thus, when the sale of the assets includes a personal service contract that contains a noncompete agreement, the purchaser can enforce its terms only with the employee's consent to an assignment.  However, in the cases of (1) a 100 percent stock purchase in which the corporate entity is unchanged except for a change in name or management; (2) a corporate merger in which two corporations unite into a single corporation and the surviving corporation assumes the rights and liabilities of the merging corporation; or (3) where a corporation merely undergoes a name change, the surviving corporation assumes the right to enforce a noncompete by operation of law and no assignment is necessary.  This outcome is based upon Florida statutory law governing merger, which provides that the "surviving corporation of a merger 'shall have all the rights, privileges, immunities and powers, and shall be subject to all of the duties and liabilities' of the merged corporation." § 607.1106, Fla. Stat.

Illinois: Marty Bishop of our Chicago office writes:

The general rule in Illinois is that "parties may freely assign rights and duties under a contract."  Automed Technologies, Inc. v. Eller, 160 F. Supp. 2d 915, 923 (N.D. Ill. 2001) (citing Patrick Media Group, Inc. v. DuPage Water Comm'n, 630 N.E.2d 958, 965 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994)).  Accordingly, in stark contrast to Nevada, Illinois courts have recognized the assignability of noncompete agreements.  See Hexacomb Corp. v. GTW Enterprises, 875 F. Supp. 457, 464 (N.D. Ill. 1993); Hamer Holding Group v. Elmore, 560 N.E.2d 907, 917 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990).  Even where an employment contract is silent as to assignability, "courts generally permit assignment of restrictive covenants to a corporate acquirer."  Automed, 160 F. Supp. 2d at 924; see Hexacomb, 875 F. Supp. At 464 ("A successor corporation in an asset purchase can enforce confidentiality agreements and covenants not to compete that an employee signed with its predecessor corporation.") (citing A. Fink & Sons v. Goldberg, 139 A. 408 (N.J. Ct. Chan. 1927)).  The assignability rule applies equally in the context of mergers, see, e.g., Unisource Worldwide, Inc. v. Carrara, 244 F. Supp. 2d 977, 981 (C.D. Ill. 2003) (holding that merged entity could enforce restrictive covenants against former employees even though employment agreements were silent as to assignments), and asset purchase agreements, see, e.g., Hamer, 560 N.E.2d at 919 (holding that buyer in asset purchase agreement had standing to enforce restrictive covenant assigned as part of that agreement, concluding that "the trial court's determination that plaintiff failed to establish a protectable interest in the restrictive covenant was against the manifest weight of the evidence and contrary to law.").

Maryland: David Sanders of our Washington office writes:

In a merger of entities where the CEO and stakeholders of the predecessor and successor were the same, and where nothing about the operations of the business changed, the court found that the successor was entitled to enforce a noncompete between the predecessor entity and an employee. National Instrument, LLC v. Braithwaite, 2006 MDBT 11; 2006 WL 2405831; 2006 Md. Cir. Ct. LEXIS 12 (Md. Cir. Ct. 2006). The court noted further that "even if the Covenant had been assigned from [the predecessor] to [the successor], [the successor] can still enforce it," because a person contracting with a corporation should assume that the corporation and its personnel could change, there had been no change in the employee's duties and obligations, and the employee did not object to the merger and continued to accept the benefits of employment after the merger.  Id. (relying, in part, on cases from Missouri and New Hampshire: Alexander & Alexander, Inc. v. Koelz, 722 S.W.2d 311 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986) and Town of Hampton v. Hampton Beach Improvement Co., 107 N.H. 89, 218 A.2d 442 (N.H. 1966)). It should be noted, however, that the court did leave the door open for a different result if two unrelated entities were to merge. Id.

Massachusetts: Russell Beck of our Boston office writes as follows at pages 134-36 of his book entitled, Negotiating, Drafting and Enforcing Noncompetition Agreements & Related Restricted Covenants (3rd Edition 2009):

No appellate level court has directly addressed the issue of whether a successor in interest or assignee of a noncompetition agreement may enforce the agreement in the absence of express consent from the restricted party (in the noncompetition agreement or otherwise). See Chiswick, Inc. v. Constas, 2004 WL 1895044, at *2 (Mass. Super. Ct. June 17, 2004) (Kane, J.) (finding no likelihood of success on the merits because issue is unresolved). There are, however, several trial court decisions suggesting that consent is in fact required. Next Generation Vending v. Bruno, C.A. No. 08-0365-G, at *5 (May 20, 2008) (Quinlan, J.) ("noncompete clauses are not assignable unless specifically assented to by the employee"); Getman & Cleary Schultz Ins., LLC v. USI Holdings Corp., 2005 WL 2183159, at *2 (Mass. Super. Ct. Sept. 1, 2005) (Gants, J.) (refusing to enforce noncompetition agreement-albeit enforcing other restrictive covenants-where employer merged into larger company and employee's noncompetition agreement could not be viewed as contemplating restrictions that would inhere with respect to much larger company); Securitas Sec. Servs. USA, Inc. v. Jenkins, 2003 WL 21781385, at *5 (Mass. Super. Ct. July 18, 2003) (van Gestel, J.) (noncompetition agreement is not assignable without express consent). But see Banc of Am. Corporate Ins. Agency, LLC v. Verille, C.A. No. CV2007-01099, at *5 (Mass. Super. Ct. Aug. 6, 2007) (Connors, J.) (ignoring issue, except to question to whom any goodwill belonged, predecessor company or employee). Consistent with these decisions, the Appeals Court observed in Middlesex Neurological Associates, Inc. v. Cohen, 3 Mass. App. Ct. 126, 127-28 (1975), that the defendant had not argued that he did not consent to the assignment, thus implying that consent is in fact required. Even if an agreement states that it will apply to a successor entity, courts will review the nature of the transactions involved to determine whether, in fact, the new employer fits within the strict construction of "successor," as defined in the agreement. If the noncompetition agreement is with a parent company, for example, and the subsidiary - through which the employee worked - is sold, the noncompetition agreement might not apply after the sale. See, e.g., L-3 Communications Corp. v. Reveal Imaging Techs., Inc., No. 035810-BLS, at *11 (Dec. 2, 2004) (van Gestel, J.) (court narrowly construed agreement to find that agreement did not cover post-sale employment). The reason for the courts' resistance to permitting unbridled assignment of noncompetition agreements was explained by Judge van Gestel in Securitas Security Services USA as follows:

"[E]very one has a right to select and determine with whom he will contract, and cannot have another person thrust upon him without his consent." New England Cabinet Works v. Morris, 226 Mass. 246, 250 (1917).

. . .

[W]hen rights arising out of a contract are coupled with obligations to be performed by the contractor, and involve such relation of personal confidence that it must have been intended that the rights should be exercised and the obligations performed by him along, the contract, including both his rights and his obligations, cannot be assigned without the consent of the other party to the contract. Id.

. . .

Yet another, and possibly quite significant, reason for not permitting assignments of these kinds of agreements without assent is the fact that [the employee], knowing the character and personality of [the employer], might be ready and willing to safeguard the trust which it imposed in him by granting restrictive covenant against leaving his employment. This does not mean, however, that [the employee] would have been willing to suffer this same restraint for the benefit of a stranger to the original undertaking. Certainly [the employee] could not assign his contract with [the employer] . . . without [the employer's] consent. For similar reasons [the employer] could not assign [the employee's] employment agreement to another corporate entity with [the employee's] assent.

Securitas Sec. Servs. USA, Inc. v. Jenkins, 2003 WL 21781385, at *5.

Michigan: Jeffrey Kopp of our Detroit office writes:

Michigan, like many other states, recognizes that contracts are generally assignable, unless forbidden by public policy or the contract itself, or its provisions are personal in nature.  Michigan courts also recognize that noncompetition clauses are favored as long as they are reasonable in geographic scope and duration. Although there is a dearth of case law regarding the issue of whether noncompete agreements may be assigned in Michigan, a few cases suggest that a successor company can enforce noncompete agreements against the predecessor's former employee. For instance, in Logical Networks, Inc. v Murdock, No. 239779, 2002 Mich. App. LEXIS 1374, **10-11 (Mich. Ct. App., Oct 1, 2002) and Virchow Krause & Co v. Schmidt, 2006 WL 1751835 (Mich. Ct. App., June 27, 2006) (both unpublished cases), courts enforced noncompete agreements by the successor company following asset sales. The court rejected the employee's arguments that the contracts were personal in nature and therefore unassignable.  Thus, given the broad enforceability of restrictive covenants in Michigan, which has been very employer-favorable in recent years, assignment clauses that are well-drafted and included in noncompete agreements are likely to be upheld by Michigan courts.  

New York: Kim Shur of our Washington office (and formerly of our New York office) writes:

Under New York law, a contract containing a noncompete agreement generally is assignable in a merger or sale of assets, even if the agreement in question is silent as to the issue of assignability, so long as the original parties to the contract so intended and the agreement was not one for personal services.  See e.g., Eisner Computer Solutions, LLC v. Gluckstern, 293 A.d.2d 289, 741 N.Y.S.2d 511 (1st Dep't 2002); Special Prods. Mfg. v. Douglass, 159 A.d.2d 847, 553 N.Y.S.2d 506 (3d Dep't 1990).  New York courts long have held that executory contracts, which do not involve exceptional personal skills and which the assignee can perform without adversely affecting the rights and interests of the adverse party, are freely assignable absent a contractual, statutory or public policy prohibition.  Special Prods. Mfg., 553 N.Y.S.2d at 509.  New York courts also have held that where the intent to create a covenant not to compete is unmistakably evident in an agreement between the parties, it benefits the successors and assigns of an employer so long as a second agreement does not specifically forbid such an assignment. Id.; see also Abalene Pest Control Service, Inc. v. Powell, 8 A.D.2d 734, 187 N.Y.S.2d 381 (2d Dep't 1959) (a subsequent sale of a business will pass the covenant not to compete as an incident of the goodwill of the business even though it is not expressly assigned so long as the original contract was not one involving personal credit or confidence).  In sum, in determining whether a noncompete agreement can be assigned in the context of a merger or sale of assets, New York courts will focus on the intention of the parties and try to determine whether assignability was contemplated in the first instance, whether assignability is necessary to protect the goodwill of the business being sold, and whether the contract was for personal services.    

Virginia: David Sanders of our Washington office writes:

Virginia courts will not permit the assignment of a noncompete contained in an employment contract in the context of an asset acquisition, unless both parties agree to the assignment. The Reynolds and Reynolds Company v. Hardee, 932 F. Supp. 149 (E.D. Va. 1996), affirmed, 133 F. 3d 916 (4th Cir. 1997) (unpublished).

Wisconsin: Sharon Mollman Elliott of our Madison office writes:

Because Wisconsin courts deem that the parties to a merger have become one, the surviving company automatically assumes the noncompete agreements of each party that is merged into it.  Unless the covenant not to compete specifically provides that it does not survive a merger, the surviving company can enforce the covenant as if it were its own.  See Farm Credit Services v. Wysocki, 627 N.W.2d 444 n.2 (Wis. 2001).