All wisdom is in the footnotes...
On July 23, the Massachusetts Appeals Court issued a decision (Synergistics Technology, Inc. v. Putnam Investments, LLC) involving a defendant who, aware of the plaintiff's noncompete agreement with its former employee, hired the employee. The plaintiff had not "induced" the employee to breach his contract, but did "facilitate" the employee's breach of his agreement. As a result, after a trial, the jury found in favor of the defendant on a claim of tortious interference (i.e., a claim that the defendant had induced a breach of contract through improper motive or improper means). Nevertheless, the jury found that the defendant had violated Massachusetts' unfair competition statute (G.L. c. 93A). The trial court, accepting the jury's finding, awarded double damages and attorneys' fees.
The Appeals Court reversed. The Court reasoned that facilitating the breach of a contract (at least under the circumstances of that case) was simply not "unfair or deceptive" - a required element of a claim for unfair competition under G.L. c. 93A.
Although the case has already received some attention, it does not actually appear to effect a change of law. All it really says is that G.L. c. 93A does not create a cause of action for what is (essentially) "tortious interference lite" - i.e., tortious interference with a lower standard. In this regard, the type of conduct at which the law of tortious interference is targeted has been well-developed and achieves a considered balance of the interests on both sides. The Appeals Court has now simply stated that G.L. c. 93A does not expand that.
Instructively, if G.L. c. 93A were used to expand the reach of a tortious interference claim - and permit multiple damages and attorneys' fees on top of it - it would all but eliminate the tort of tortious interference. Of course, that said, 93A has been said to eliminate the reliance requirement of a fraud claim, thereby creating a cause of action for "fraud lite." Such a result can at least be somewhat understood insofar as it permits a court to penalize deceptive conduct that would otherwise go unpunished. In contrast, the conduct in the Synergistics case wasn't deceptive or otherwise particularly unfair; the conduct simply did not rise to level of something that would raise an eyebrow of someone inured to the rough and tumble of commerce - the traditional 93A standard for such a case.
So, in short, the case does not make new law in connection with G.L. c. 93A.
The case may, however, be significant for future noncompete litigaiton. Its significance derives from a passing comment in footnote. (The fact that the most significant aspect of the case was relegated to a footnote would likely come as no surprise to Boston University School of Law Professor Walter Miller, who advises his students that "all wisdom is in the footnotes.")
The footnote states, "In this context it is pertinent, but not dispositive, that covenants not to compete are generally disfavored unless they are appropriately limited in time and space, and often require individualized judicial consideration. See Boulanger v. Dunkin' Donuts, Inc., 442 Mass. 635, 639 (2004), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 922 (2005). Technological advances and Internet commerce have further complicated traditional analysis in this area." (Emphasis added.) This sentiment about the impact of technological advances has been expressed before, but not by the Appeals Court since 1980 (i.e., well before the Internet became ubiquitous) or by Massachusetts's highest court (the Supreme Judicial Court) since 1898. The fact that the Appeals Court has now reiterated technology's impact on the noncompete analysis likely portends a greater tolerance for noncompete agreements with a broad geographic reach.